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Articles and Essays
Attorney Conflicts of Interest
in Corporate Acquisitions
by
MARC I. STEINBERG*
Although the subject of counsel's conflicts of interest has been
treated in the general corporate context by several scholarly sources, I
such conflicts in the specialized corporate acquisition setting thus far
have not been fully addressed. 2 The Hastings Law Journal is to be ap-
plauded for devoting this Symposium principally to attorney conflicts of
interest that arise in the corporate acquisition context.
This Article seeks to present a concrete analysis in conjunction with
a recommended framework of attorney conflicts of interest in the pub-
licly-held corporate acquisition context. First, the Article will present a
general overview of conflicts of interest for the corporate counsel. Sec-
ond, these conflicts issues will be addressed in the corporate takeover
setting, followed by an examination of such conflicts in parent-subsidiary
mergers and leveraged buy-outs in which incumbent management ob-
tains a substantial equity interest in the entity. Third, the Article will
* Professor of Law; University of Maryland, School of Law; Member California, Mary-
land, and District of Columbia Bars. A.B. 1972, University of Michigan; J.D. 1975, University
of California, Los Angeles; LL.M. 1977, Yale University.
I thank Dean Michael J. Kelly and John M. Koneck, Esq. for their helpful comments.
The views expressed herein are solely my own.
1. See, e.g., M. STEINBERG & R. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND
STATE ENFORCEMENT §§ 9:01-9:24 (1985); Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REV.
807 (1977); Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: Study of the Federal
Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243 (1981); Riger, Disqualifying Coun-
sel in Corporate Representation-Eroding Standards in Changing Times, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV.
995 (1980); Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws-
Some Observations; 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1973); Steinberg, Corporate/Securities Counsel-
Conflicts of Interest, 8 J. CORP. L. 577 (1983); Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest
in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244 (1981) [hereinafter, Developments].
2. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 1, at 1342-43 (citing ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Informal Op. 1056 (1968)).
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focus on counsel's conflicts of interest in the corporate acquisition con-
text when advising committees of the board of directors. Finally, the
substantive impact of various procedural mechanisms will be explored.
I. General Conflicts of Interest for Corporate Counsel
An attorney's general conflict-of-interest responsibilities under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct are governed by rule 1.7. 3 Under
this rule, counsel must not represent a client if there is a disabling con-
flict of interest.4 Where a conflict, however, is only potential and is un-
likely to eventuate 5  counsel may undertake (or continue) the
representation if the client consents after consultation. 6 Where represen-
tation of multiple parties is involved, dual representation is permitted,
provided that: the lawyer discloses the potential conflict and its ramifica-
tions to the parties, counsel believes that such multiple representation is
consistent with each client's best interests, and each client consents after
3. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. Of course, a number of states have not adopted the Model Rules. See A. KAUFMAN,
PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 16-21, 166-72 (2d ed. 1984); Hall, States Modi-
fying ABA's Ethics Rules, Legal Times, Aug. 12, 1985, at 1. Reference to the Model Rules in
this Article serves as a convenient method to assess counsel's general responsibilities in ad-
dressing conflicts-of-interest dilemmas.
4. Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will
be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely af-
fect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include expla-
nation of the implications of the common representation and the advan-
tages and risks involved.
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7.
5. Hence, although a potential conflict does not itself prevent such representation, -[t]he
critical questions are the likelihood that conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will
materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alter-
natives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the cli-
ent." MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 comment.
6. Rule 1.7 does not expressly call for "reasonable" consent by the client. The comment
to the rule, however, makes clear that obtaining the prospective client's consent does not effec-
tuate compliance with rule 1.7 where a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the represen-
tation would be improper. Id.
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consultation. 7
A number of other Model Rules address particular situations in
which conflicts of interest may arise for the corporate practitioner. For
example, rule 1.9 addresses the issue of subsequent representation in a
substantially related matter in which the prospective client's interests are
materially adverse to the interests of a prior client." Rule 1.1 (a) focuses
on the imputed disqualification of a law firm and the propriety of
"screening" mechanisms when a former government attorney becomes
associated with a firm which represents a client in a matter in which the
former government attorney participated while serving with the govern-
ment.9 Finally, rule 1.13(e) deals with the propriety of counsel simulta-
neously representing the corporation and defendant corporate fiduciaries
in a shareholder derivative action.10
7. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7(b); see supra notes 4-6.
8. Rule 1.9 provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when
the information has become generally known.
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.9. For judicial construction of the "substantial relation-
ship" standard, see, for example, Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980); West-
inghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1978); Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1975); T. C.
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). For commen-
tary on this standard, see Riger, supra note 1, at 1007-18; Steinberg, supra note 1, at 584-88;
Developments, supra note 1, at 1317-32.
9. Rule 1.11(a) provides:
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a
private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally
and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government
agency consents after consultation. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is
associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter
unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter
and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency
to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.11(a). For case law and law review commentary address-
ing this issue, see, for example, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc),
vacated on issue of appealability, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Cutler, Conflicts of Interest, 30 EMORY
L.J. 1015, 1022-27 (1981); Ferber & Gonson, Disqualification of Law Firms, 13 REv. SEc.
REG. 875 (1980); Mundheim, Conflict of Interest and the Former Government Employee: Re-
thinking the Revolving Door, 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 707 (1981); cf MODEL RULES, supra
note 3, Rule 1.10.
10. The comment to rule 1.13(e) states:
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Neither the Model Rules nor other codified rules of conduct, how-
ever, expressly focus on counsel's ethical responsibilities in the corporate
acquisition setting. Given the relative frequency and the high financial
stakes of these transactions, this omission is unfortunate. The dearth of
judicial case law addressing this subject compounds the problem.I Nor-
mative standards should be established, preferably by the American Bar
Association's Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, to
guide counsel's conduct.
II. Takeover Bids
A. General Rule
Courts and commentators generally agree that, in the absence of a
disabling conflict of interest (which includes in this context the perpetra-
tion of illegal conduct), 12 the incumbent board of directors may be
looked to as representing the corporate entity.1 3 Hence, in corporate ac-
quisitions, it is often presumed that, because the board's function is to act
Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation
may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the super-
vision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially
the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but
usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization.
The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an
action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone
resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's
affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if
the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organiza-
tion, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the law-
yer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who
should represent the directors and the organization.
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.13(e) comment. With respect to dual representation in
the derivative suit context, "the trend appears to be that older cases have refused to disqualify
counsel while the more recent decisions require the corporation to retain independent coun-
sel." Steinberg, supra note 1, at 594.
11. There are a few cases addressing this general subject. See, e.g., Financial General
Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Bronston,
658 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
12. On this subject, see generally In re Carter and Johnson, Exchange Act Release No.
17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981); M. STEIN-
BERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND RE:MEDIES § 12.06[2] (1987); Fiflis,
Choice of Federal or State Law for Attorneys' Professional Responsibility in Securities Matters,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1236 (1981); Gruenbaum, Clients'Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations:
A Response to Professor Kramer, 68 GEO. L.J. 191 (1979); Kelleher, Scourging the Moneylend-
ers from the Temple: The SEC, Rule 2(e) and the Lawyers, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501 (1980).
13. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); M. STEIN-
BERG & R. FERRARA, supra note 1, § 9:19; Developments, supra note 1, at 1342-43.
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in the best interests of the corporation, there is no conflict between man-
agement and the shareholders. 14 For example, in the hostile takeover
setting, an evidently accepted practice is for the board to evaluate the bid
with the guidance of the corporation's counsel and investment bankers. 15
Because the board, as indicated in several judicial decisions, is normally
deemed disinterested in this context, no conflict of interest exists.16 As a
result, separate counsel need not be retained to represent the interests of
the various corporate constituencies.' 7
B. Alternative Proposals for Reform
The general practice described above may be subject to criticism. In
many takeovers the bulk of the shareholders, looking to the substantial
premium normally paid by the acquiror, favor the successful consumma-
tion of the offer. The board of directors, on the other hand, may adopt
defensive tactics with the intention to retain control rather than to benefit
the corporation.' 8 Moreover, if the interests of other constituencies are
to be considered, as now authorized by some state statutes,19 these inter-
14. See, eg., Harrison, View From Inside Counsel, in TENDER OFFERS: DEVELOPMENTS
AND COMMENTARIES 145 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover
Bid, 28 CASE W. REs. 882 (1978).
15. See supra notes 13-14.
16. See, e.g., Panter, 646 F.2d at 296 (applying Delaware law); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. In-
terNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York law); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (applying Delaware law); Pogostin v.
Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624-25 (Del. 1984) (applying Delaware law). But see Lynch & Steinberg,
The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979).
17. See supra notes 13-16. But see Federal Trade Commission v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d
1336 (D.C. Cir. 1980), where, in the acquisition context, the court precluded counsel for Ex-
xon from representing certain divisions of Reliance Electric Company:
Central to the existence of this conflict is the fact that while Exxon and the [subject
Reliance Divisions] now share a corporate identity, that identity might be shattered
as a result of the challenge mounted by the FTC to the acquisition of Reliance by
Exxon. Should divestiture be ordered by the FTC, Exxon and the [subject Reliance
Divisions] will become competitors. This possibility, which would result directly
from the proceeding at which Exxon seeks joint representation, gives rise to a funda-
mental conflict between Exxon and the [subject Reliance Divisions].
Id. at 1345; cf. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 563 F.2d 671, 673-
74 (5th Cir. 1977) (challenged attorneys not disqualified from representing third- and fourth-
party defendants in the absence of a conflict of interest between such defendants).
18. See Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1028 (1982); Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control. A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984); Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1161 (1981); Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposal for Reform, 36 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 377 (1985); infra notes 31-35, 37-39 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 408 (Purdon 1967), amended by Act. No. 1983-92,
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ests may diverge from the general shareholder populace. For example,
corporate employees and communities with corporate operations in their
locale justifiably may fear that approval of the acquisition may result in
unemployment and the loss of a major benefactor to community well-
being. 20
(1) Counsel for the Constituencies
Accordingly, an argument can be made that, in light of these con-
flicting views, separate counsel (counsel for the constituencies) with no
prior affiliation with the corporation or its fiduciaries should be retained
to represent these various corporate constituencies. Counsel's principal
role in this context would be to ensure that the views of the major con-
stituencies from both a legal and policy perspective are brought to the
board's attention. Although management may reject the positions as-
serted, the presence of separately retained independent counsel would
help ensure that the various countervailing arguments will be communi-
cated and explained to the board.
There are, however, at least two significant problems with such an
approach. First, because the different corporate constituencies likely will
take diverse positions in response to the takeover bid,2 1 there may be an
actual conflict, precluding multiple representation. 22 Second, the deci-
sion whether to accept or oppose the acquiror's offer remains within the
board's discretion, the very body whose alleged inability to consider im-
partially the various interests prompted the appointment of "counsel for
the constituencies." Consequently, the role of appointed counsel might
well be superfluous, providing no tangible benefits.
Nonetheless, supporters of such a proposal might argue that counsel
1983 Pa. Legis. Serv. 773, 774 (Purdon) (providing that corporate fiduciaries "may, in consid-
ering the best interests of the corporation, consider the effects of any action upon employees,
suppliers and customers of the corporation, communities in which offices or other establish-
ments of the corporation are located and all other pertinent factors"). For commentary on the
Pennsylvania statute, see Sargent, Do the Second Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate
the Commerce Clause? A Preliminary Inquiry, in TENDER OFFERS: DEVELOPMENTS AND
COMMENTARIES 75, 80-83 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985); Steinberg, The Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover
Legislation, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 184 (1984).
20. See O'Boyle & Carey, Gulf's Departing Pittsburgh Would Deal a Harsh Blow to City's
Economy and Pride, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1984, at 33, col. 4 ("Standard Oil Co. of California's
$13.3 billion bid to acquire the oil giant has brought shudders to Pittsburgh charities, univer-
sity presidents, tax officials, ministers, and everyone else who benefits from Gulf's financial
and civic might.").
21. See supra notes 16, 18. It may be argued that counsel may act solely as the communi-
cator of the diverse views held by the various constituencies. Counsel need not advocate one
particular constituency's position over another. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
22. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7; supra notes 4-6.
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for the constituencies need not advocate one constituency's position at
the expense of others. Rather, counsel may serve solely as the "commu-
nicator" of the diverse views held by the constituencies to ensure that the
board is cognizant of the various positions. Alternatively, it may be con-
tended (although probably not convincingly because the interests of the
constituencies may be more antagonistic than mutual) that counsel's role
may be likened to that of an "intermediary" under Rule 2.223 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. By engaging in this multiple rep-
resentation as intermediary, counsel would utilize his or her persuasive
skills in an effort to convince management why certain actions should or
should not be taken. Such dialogue might shed new light for the board in
determining what response should be made to the takeover bid.2 4
23. See infra note 24. Rule 2.2 provides:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the com-
mon representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect
on the attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client's consent to the com-
mon representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms
compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make
adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of mate-
rial prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution
is unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be un-
dertaken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the
lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concern-
ing the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that
each client can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if
any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal,
the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the
subject of the intermediation.
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 2.2.
24. The comment to rule 2.2 provides in part:
A lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship
between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in
helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, work-
ing out financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an
interest, arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate or mediating a
dispute between clients. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests
by developing the parties' mutual interests. The alternative can be that each party
may have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility in some situations of
incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other rele-
vant factors, all the clients may prefer that the lawyer act as intermediary.
Id. Rule 2.2 comment (emphasis added).
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(2) The Consultative Attorney
Even assuming that appointment of "counsel for the constituencies"
is ill-advised from both a legal and practical standpoint, alternative ap-
proaches remain. One such approach is the appointment of the "consult-
ative" attorney (or law firm) to render a second-opinion. 25 Although a
second opinion is common in the medical profession, the consultative
attorney, although utilized more now than in the past,2 6 is still resorted
to on a relatively infrequent basis.2 7 The consultative attorney, having
no prior affiliation with the corporation or its fiduciaries, would be re-
tained to evaluate the relevant circumstances and to render a second
opinion regarding management's contemplated course of action.
Such a second opinion may be appropriate because, in most cases,
the corporation's outside general counsel has been retained for a pro-
longed period of time. Perhaps as a result of the substantial legal fees
earned and the long-term association with incumbent management, such
counsel may find it troublesome to advise the corporate client with the
requisite independence. Accordingly, the consultative attorney may play
the meaningful function of providing legal advice and insights from a
more neutral perspective. 28
There are important differences between the roles of counsel for the
constituencies and the consultative attorney. First, unlike counsel for the
constituencies, the consultative attorney represents the entity as a whole
rather than the various constituencies. Accordingly, the multiple repre-
25. See Sporkin & Steinberg, Second Opinion for Lawyers-The 'Consultative Lawyer;
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
26. See Letter to the Editor from Lawrence B. Pedowitz, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1983, at 2,
col. 6 ("[W]hile I wholeheartedly endorse the suggestion that lawyers should regularly consult
in order to improve the quality of their judgments, I believe it is incorrect to suggest that the
,second opinion' practice is not already extant in our profession.").
27. See Sporkin & Steinberg, supra note 25, at 1, col. 2; Editorial, A Second Opinion,
Nat'l L.J., Jan. 10, 1983, at 12, col. I ("We agree with Mr. [now Judge] Sporkin and Mr.
Steinberg that the concept [of a 'second opinion'] is a good one, and that attorneys should be
open to its use in the future. It is a provocative and workable area within the legal
profession.").
28. See Sporkin & Steinberg, supra note 25, at 3, col. 2:
There are few events as important to a corporation's welfare as when a tender
offer is made to its shareholders by another corporation, that is, an unfriendly take-
over attempt. Normally, in these instances the client will retain specialized counsel
in defending such takeover attempts. There are a number of decisions that arise
during the course of a hostile battle for control that present disparate choices to the
various interests comprising the corporate framework. Such points of decision are
susceptible to having independent counsel render a second opinion to help ensure
that the disparate interests are being duly represented.
The same "consultative" role may be played by an investment banker. See infra notes 93-105
and accompanying text.
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sentation conflict-of-interest dilemma does not surface, at least not as ex-
plicitly, in this setting. Hence, like the outside general counsel, the
consultative attorney initially may look to the incumbent board of direc-
tors as the proper representative of corporate interests.29 Second, the
advice rendered by the consultative attorney may have a greater impact
upon board conduct. Unlike counsel for the constituencies, the consulta-
tive attorney does not legally analyze the situation at issue from the per-
spectives of certain diverse interest groups but rather from that of the
corporation in its entirety. As a result, management may be in a more
difficult position to reject out-of-hand advice with which it disagrees.
Moreover, faced with the prospect that the consultative attorney is re-
tained to proffer its opinion, the corporation's general outside counsel
may be even more circumspect in formulating his or her advice.30
Hence, the consultative attorney concept may have a beneficial im-
pact on corporate accountability. Nonetheless, in either of the foregoing
alternatives, the incumbent board determines the corporation's response
to the takeover bid. Even if members of the board do not have a material
financial interest as evidenced by their lack of substantial stock owner-
ship, the inside directors31 certainly have an interest in maintaining their
positions of power within the corporate structure. 32 Any legitimate take-
29. To ensure that the presence of consultative counsel is more than an insignificant ges-
ture, such counsel, although initially looking to the incumbent board of directors as the proper
representative of corporate interests, must maintain the requisite independence.
30. This statement should not be construed as implying that retained counsel is necessar-
ily biased. In this regard, however, the following assertion may be made:
Undoubtedly, it may be argued that, where a law firm composed of a fairly large
number of attorneys serves as counsel, such second opinions are unnecessary. This is
based on the premise that an attorney working within his or her law firm often con-
sults with other attorneys in the firm before recommending action. Although this
may well be true, the principal value of a second opinion is its independence.
Although lawyers in the same firm are often free to express their independent judg-
ments, nevertheless they cannot be truly as objective as a third party examining the
situation. Further, as important as the fact of independence may well be the appear-
ance of independence.
Sporkin & Steinberg, supra note 25, at 3, col. 2.
31. "Inside" directors include those who also hold positions as officers of the corporation,
or who are otherwise employed by the company, for example, as in-house corporate counsel.
"Inside" directors also include those directors who may have a pecuniary interest in the corpo-
ration's affairs greater than that arising from ownership of a less-than-controlling block of the
corporation's shares. See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964) (burden of proof
as to whether a stock repurchase was in the corporate interest was not as great for directors
who were merely "substantial shareholders" as for those who were the Chief Executive Officer
and corporate counsel, since the former did not have "a personal pecuniary interest in the
decisions made by the board of directors ... ).
32. See Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New
Jersey law); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Delaware law).
March 1988)
over bid, particularly one that is successful, may also signify to the finan-
cial world that the insiders are inadequate managers, an image that any
reputable corporate executive loathes.33 To a certain extent, some courts
have recognized this claim of bias. When a majority of the board is com-
prised of outside directors 34 who oppose the takeover bid, these courts
have been more inclined to invoke the broad protection of the business
judgment rule. 35
(3) Counsel for the Committee
Taking the above approaches a step (or perhaps several steps) fur-
ther, an argument can be made that a corporation's response to a take-
over bid should be formulated by a committee comprised solely of
outside directors. To help ensure detachment from the inside directors,
the general inside or outside counsel should play no significant role.
Rather, separate counsel with no prior affiliation with the corporation or
its fiduciaries should be retained for the purpose of advising the commit-
tee ("counsel for the committee"). Any communication required of the
general counsel should be made directly to the counsel for the committee
and not to the outside directors. Given the outside directors' lack of
pecuniary interest and the threat (although diminishing) of monetary lia-
bility for breach of their fiduciary duties,36 it may be asserted that this
proposal provides a viable alternative: the response to the takeover bid is
33. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300-01 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (applying Delaware law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981).
34. "Outside" directors should be defined as those directors who do not otherwise enjoy a
substantial personal or business relationship with the corporation or its fiduciaries. See Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 15,384 16 SEC Docket 348,350 (Dec. 6, 1978); M. STEINBERG,
CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW PERSPECTIVE 30-31
(1983).
35. See, e.g., Panter, 646 F.2d at 293-98 (applying Delaware law). Outside directors also
are subject to claims of bias. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
36. For example, Delaware recently enacted a statute permitting directors to be absolved
from monetary liability for breach of the duty of care, provided that an appropriate provision
to that effect is contained in the subject corporation's articles of incorporation. Delaware Sen-
ate Bill No. 533, amending, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (1986); see Veasey, Finkelstein &
Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors With a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnifi-
cation, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399 (1987). A number of states are following Delaware's
lead by enacting similar statutes. See Glasgow, Changes in Liability Laws to Shield Directors
Called Critical to Companies, Baltimore Sun, Feb. 11, 1987, at C-I ("Thirteen states have al-
ready enacted legislation limiting the legal [liability] of corporate directors; another 15. includ-
ing Maryland, have such legislation pending."). Moreover, some of these state statutes are
more lax than the Delaware version. See, e.g., 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1719 (1986)
("Under the new [Ohio] law, the business judgment rule protects directors from monetary
liability [including actions brought for injunctive relief] except where clear and convincing
evidence demonstrates a deliberative intent to injure the company or a reckless disregard for its
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delegated to the most disinterested members of the board who, with the
advice proffered by counsel for the committee, will seek to represent the
corporation's best interests.
This alternative, however, is not without problems. Irrespective of
whether one is an inside or outside director, the problem of structural
bias37 remains. Outside directors are selected by insiders and owe their
retention on the board to the insiders. During their tenure, outside direc-
tors are likely to develop friendships with their colleagues, affecting their
impartiality. Moreover, a number of the outside directors may come
from the same background as the insiders (e.g., they may themselves be
insiders of other corporations) and may have known the insiders long
before they were requested to serve as directors. There is also a certain
prestige of serving as a director of a reputable publicly held company. A
takeover bid may be viewed by outside directors as an unjustifiable insult
to their business acumen which should be swiftly rebuked.38 Hence, far
from being assumed to be independent, outside directors are potentially
biased.3 9
welfare."); Goolsby & Whitson, Virginia's New Corporate Code, 19 REV. SEC. & COMMODI-
TIES REG. 147 (1986).
37. "Structural bias" may be defined as "inherent prejudice... resulting from the com-
position and character of the board of directors [and management]." Note, The Business Judg-
ment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600, 601 n.14 (1980)
[hereinafter Note, Derivative Suits]. For further discussion of the concept of structural bias,
see id. at 619-26; cf. Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 53-54 (5th Cir. 1980)
(recognizing the possibility of structural bias, the court held that, due to conflicts of interest,
the board was incompetent to compromise the plaintiff shareholders' derivative claims), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709, 716-
18 (Iowa 1983) (recognizing structural bias problem in refusing to dismiss derivative suit
against corporate fiduciaries where members comprising the special litigation committee were
appointed to the committee by defendant fiduciaries).
The inherent problem of structural bias is discussed at length in Note, The Propriety of
Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1894 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Note, Judicial Deference]. Drawing upon studies of group dynamics, the author of the
Note concluded: "Given cohesiveness and informational dependence in the boardroom, direc-
tors are likely to conform to the expectations both of management and of their fellow board
members." Id. at 1901.
38. Hence, although not financially interested, such outside directors may be "interested"
in maintaining their
positions of power, prestige and prominence.... They are "interested" in defending
against outside attack the management which they have, in fact, installed or main-
tained in power .... And they are "interested" in maintaining the public reputation
of their own leadership and stewardship against the claims of "raiders" who say that
they can do better.
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300-01 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (applying Delaware law) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981).
39. See Steinberg, Some Thoughts on Regulation of Tender Offers, 43 MD. L. REV. 240,
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There is an even more practical reason why outside directors should
not control the corporation's response to a takeover bid: they may not
possess the requisite familiarity with and knowledge of the enterprise. 40
Because many outside directors do not work intimately with the corpora-
tion on a frequent basis and may lack the necessary sophistication to
assess both the short- and long-term value of the corporation, they
should not be saddled with this difficult task. Accordingly, outside direc-
tors should have input but not the sole or even primary responsibility in
determining the corporation's response to a takeover bid. 41
An alternative approach would employ the counsel for the commit-
tee concept but would structure the committee's role as advisory in na-
ture. Hence, the committee, with the assistance of separately retained
counsel (and investment bankers), scrutinizes the merits of the takeover
bid and informs the board of directors of its position. In this way, the
outside directors have a significant, yet not a determinative impact, upon
the corporation's response to the third-party offer.
Although appealing, this approach has certain drawbacks. First, for
the reasons set forth above,42 outside directors may be incapable of
reaching an informed, impartial, and competent determination. Second,
far from being advisory, the committee's opinion, in practice, may pre-
clude the board of directors from taking a contrary position. The mone-
tary liability exposure may be simply too great for insiders to implement
a defensive posture inconsistent with the committee's determination. 43
Third, the approach may be impractical. In many contested takeover
bids, time is of the essence. To mount a successful takeover defense, ac-
244 (1984) ("Incumbent management's control of the proxy machinery and general informa-
tional processes, combined with its control of the methods for selecting outside directors, fre-
quently result in undue directorial loyalty to management rather than the exercise of
independent judgment.") (footnotes omitted).
40. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP ACT § 8.42(b) (1984)z Note, Judicial Defer-
ence, supra note 37, at 1898 ("Confronted by difficult issues of business policy and largely
dependent upon management for information about these issues, [outside] directors are likely
to believe that management's views and judgments are worth adopting.") (footnote omitted).
41. See supra note 40. But see Williams address, "Corporate Accountability." at 26.
before the Fifth Annual Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego. Calif. (Jan. 18, 1978).
where former SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams described his ideal board of directors as
consisting entirely of outside directors except for the chief executive officer who would not be
chairman of the board. For further discussion of the Williams' address and related issues. see
M. STEINBERG, supra note 34, at 18-23.
42. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 899 (Del. 1985). The enactment by
Delaware and other states of legislation certainly lessens this risk but does not eliminate it. See
supra note 36.
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tion often needs to be promptly undertaken. 44 In this context, the subject
corporation may not afford the luxury of a time-consuming advisory
opinion.45
(4) The Preferable Approach-The Consultative Attorney
Under the framework adopted by several courts, a board of direc-
tors under the business judgment rule may fend off a takeover bid in
order to maintain the enterprise as an ongoing viable entity.46 With this
44. See, for example, Judge Friendly's statement in Electronic Specialty Co. v. Interna-
tional Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), that takeover contests are not conducted
"'in the peace of a quiet chamber,' but under the stresses of the market place." Id. at 948
(quoting Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 277 F.2d 9, 13 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 879 (1960)). Because boards of directors on both sides must "act
quickly, sometimes impulsively, often in angry response to what they consider, whether rightly
or wrongly, to be low blows by the other side," Judge Friendly concluded that there will
"probably... no more be a perfect tender offer than a perfect trial." Id. at 948.
On the other hand, because of the Supreme Court's decision upholding the constitutional-
ity of the Indiana "anti-takeover" statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct.
1637, 1652 (1987), target management in states enacting similar legislation will be provided
with more time to engineer defensive maneuvers. Under the Indiana statute a shareholder
meeting need not be called until fifty days after the acquiror's request. Id. at 1647. In view of
the twenty-business-day period that tender offers must remain open under federal law, SEC
rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1987), the Indiana and similar state legislation have the
effect of increasing the time period in which target management can implement defensive ac-
tions. Note, moreover, that where a takeover bid occurs in a regulated industry, such as the
banking industry, the battle may proceed at a more leisurely pace. See, e.g., First Interstate
Bancorp's hostile bid for Bank America Corporation, described in 4 Corp. Control Alert No. 4
(April 1987).
45. This problem may be alleviated by having management and the committee comprised
of outside directors simultaneously undertake their assessments. If this is implemented, man-
agement will initially develop its course of conduct without the input of the outside directors.
After developing a strategy, given applicable time pressures, it may be difficult on a practical
level for management to alter that strategy after hearing from the committee. But see supra
note 44. Moreover, even if this "timing" situation is resolved, other significant problems re-
main with respect to the counsel for the committee concept. See supra notes 37-45 and accom-
panying text.
46. See cases cited supra note 16. Note, however, that the business judgment rule does
not apply where the company is to be broken up and not maintained as a separate ongoing
entity. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,863, at 94,211 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying Michigan law); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML
SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York law); Revlon,
Inc., v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986) (applying Dela-
ware law). Moreover, even where the defensive maneuvers are undertaken to maintain the
company's independence, a number of courts apply a modified version of the business judg-
ment rule (e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (applying
Delaware law)), or decline to apply the rule where a purpose underlying management's tactics
is to retain control (e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 1984)
(applying New York law)). For further discussion, see Brennan, New Cases on the Business
Judgment Rule: Defending Defensive Tactics Becomes More Difficult, 14 SEc. REG. L.J. 245
(1986).
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principle in focus, attention should turn to providing the means by which
the board can more effectively represent the corporation's best interests.
In the legal-advice context, the appointment of the consultative attorney
to provide a second opinion, although far from perfect, should be viewed
as a preferable route.4 7
The consultative attorney (or consultative law firm), however, may
itself have an inherent bias. A number of major law firms today have the
reputation of counseling subject corporations to ward off hostile bidders.
With each successful defense, the law firm's reputation is enhanced in the
eyes of potential target managements. Hence, it is to such a law firm's
financial benefit to devise successful legal strategies for implementation
by subject corporations. 48 Retention of such a law firm as separate coun-
sel may be appropriate after an informed board acting in good faith de-
termines to oppose a takeover bid; but it may be questioned whether
retaining the firm prior to a bidder indicating interest serves the corpora-
tion's and shareholders' best interests. Given the realities of corporate
practice, however, these firms will certainly continue to be separately re-
tained prior to any acquiror overtures. On balance, this approach can be
justified. The development of anti-takeover strategies with expert coun-
sel's input is a valid planning arrangement. With these defensive meas-
ures in place, the board is more likely to defeat inadequate bids, rather
than having to fend off such bids without sufficient ammunition. More-
over, the adoption of these measures, at least in theory, does not prevent
the board from making a dispassionate assessment of the bid's merits. In
this regard, however, separately retained expert counsel's role in devising
and counseling the board's adoption of anti-takeover strategies precludes
it from being retained as consultative counsel.
Although in depth discussion of "poison pill" anti-takeover provi-
sions unilaterally adopted by a board of directors49 is beyond the scope of
47. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
48. Life Tenure for Managers?. Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1987, at 32, col. I (in reaction to the
Supreme Court's decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637
(1987), upholding the constitutionality of the Indiana anti-takeover statute, the Journal
opined: "Lawyer Martin Lipton, king of the entrenched-manager bar, is doing cartwheels.-):
see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 177 (Del. 1986):
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); infra notes 90-92
and accompanying text.
49. A "poison pill" is "[a]n antitakeover provision whereby a class of certain securities.
dividends or warrants of the target company are convertible upon consummation of any enu-
merated transaction or event into the common stock or other security of the target [or cash]."
M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 744 (1986), derivedfromn Appendix 3 to Honorable
Arthur J. Goldberg's Separate Statement for the SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers
(1983).
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this Article,50 certain of these provisions may have the practical effect of
being "show-stoppers," 5' in essence deterring hostile bids from being
made.5 2 Absent adequate disclosure to shareholders and their approval
of such poison pill-provisions, serious conflicts-of-interest issues may be
present.5 3 In such "show-stopper" situations, counsel is advising unilat-
eral board adoption of anti-takeover provisions that may be contrary to
shareholder welfare and wealth maximization for the corporation.5 4
Although the argument has been made that such provisions merely pro-
vide the board with the leverage to bargain rigorously in order to procure
the optimum price, 55 absent firm empirical evidence establishing this
assertion 5 6 the attorney conflict of interest dilemma in drafting and ad-
vising unilateral board adoption of these provisions should be
acknowledged.
Due to the presence of structural bias and the appearance of impro-
priety, a lawyer or firm qualified to serve as consultative attorney to
render an impartial second opinion should have no prior association with
the corporation or its fiduciaries and should be knowledgeable in matters
of takeover law.5 7 Attorneys associated with such a law firm generally
50. For material on the poison pill, see, for example, Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500
A.2d 1346, 1351 (Del. 1985); A Study on the Economics of Poison Pills, [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,971 (Mar. 5, 1986) [hereinafter SEC study]; M. STEIN-
BERG, supra note 12, § 11.05; Chittur, Wall Street's Teddy Bear: The 'Poison Pill' as a Take-
over Defense, 11 J. CORP. L. 25 (1985); Dawson, Pence, & Stone, Poison Pill Defensive
Measures, 42 Bus. LAW. 423 (1987).
51. "A 'show-stop' maneuver is any action taken by target management, such as the sale
of the company's crown jewel, which has the effect of materially impeding or precluding share-
holders from tendering their stock to the 'hostile' bidder." Steinberg, supra note 39, at 250.
52. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985).
53. See, eg., Ingersoll, Securities Industry Association Urges Congress to Tighten Takeover
Regulation, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1987, at 70, col. 1 (The Securities Industry Association rec-
ommended "[o]utlaw[ing] 'poison pill' provisions designed to make a company prohibitively
expensive to acquire, without shareholder approval.").
54. See SEC Study, supra note 50; Friedenberg, Jaws III. The Impropriety of Shark-
Repellant Amendments as a Takeover Defense, 7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 32 (1982); Gilson, The Case
Against Repellant Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 775 (1982).
55. See Dawson, Pence, & Stone, supra note 50, at 425-26.
56. But see SEC Study, supra note 50, at 88,044 (Upon evaluating the 2.4% decline in the
market price of stocks of corporations over a two-day period following the adoption of poison
pills, the SEC's Chief Economist concluded that "the effect of poison pills to deter prospective
hostile takeover bids outweighs the beneficial effects that come from increased bargaining lev-
erage of the target management.").
57. It may be asserted that the consultative attorney should be required to have recently
represented on a fairly equal basis both offerors and subject corporations in contested takeover
bids. The frequency of representation of offerors and targets need not be precisely equal. Such
representation, however, must be rendered during contested bids in order to be relevant in this
context. By representing both bidders and targets in contested bids, counsel will be less likely
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will be highly qualified to advise in this consultative role. Nonetheless,
such counsel, if retained by incumbent management, may give the ap-
pearance that they favor the incumbent board. To lessen this effect as
much as practicable, the selection of the consultative attorney (or law
firm) should be within the outside directors' purview. In this way, the
corporation and its various constituencies benefit from procuring expert
advice from counsel who has no prior affiliation with the corporation or
its fiduciaries, thereby increasing the likelihood that the second opinion
will be truly independent. 58
III. Parent Squeeze-Outs And Leveraged Buy-Outs
The foregoing discussion presumed that the subject corporation's
board of directors or a controlling shareholder did not have a material
financial interest in the proposed transaction. Such a financial stake,
however, increases the potential for conflict. This section will consider
two types of transactions in which this problem exists, namely, squeeze-
out mergers 59 in which the parent corporation eliminates the public
shareholders of its subsidiary (or alternatively when a controlling share-
holder of a corporation uses his or her power to take the enterprise pri-
vate) and leveraged buy-outs60 in which corporate management procures
a substantial equity interest in the enterprise.
A. Controlling Shareholder Squeeze-Outs
With respect to squeeze-out mergers, the parent corporation, as con-
to have a bias, albeit unconsciously, in favor of one side over the other. On the other hand,
such a requirement may be too rigid. Irrespective of whether counsel principally has repre-
sented targets or bidders in hostile battles, it may be argued that the requisite expertise and
independence to render a second opinion is present.
58. See Sporkin & Steinberg, supra note 25, at 3; supra note 30. The same "consultative"
role may be played by an investment banker. See infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text;
see also Steinberg & Lindahl, The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 351,
406 (1984). For discussion concerning why such counsel should have no prior affiliation with
the corporation or its fiduciaries, see infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
59. As summarized by this author:
A cash-out or freeze-out merger, also known as a going private transaction, is a
merger in which the controlling persons of a corporation eliminate public or minority
shareholders while retaining ownership of the business. Squeeze-outs fall into three
distinct categories: (I) two-step mergers (the tender offer and the merger), (2) going
private transactions, and (3) mergers of long-held affiliates.
Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 58, at 353 n.7; see Greene. Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A
Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487, 490-94 (1976).
60. A "leveraged buy-out" generally occurs where an enterprise is acquired by means of
borrowed funds to be repaid out of the entity's future earnings. See McCann & Scogin, Lever-
aged Buyouts, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 26, 1984, at 15, col. 1.
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trolling shareholder, owes a fiduciary duty to the subsidiary's public
shareholders. 6' According to the Delaware Supreme Court, the parent
corporation in such transactions must accord the minority both fair deal-
ing and fair price.62 Disregard of these obligations may give rise to a
shareholder action premised on breach of fiduciary duty.63 Although a
number of other states have relegated a minority shareholder solely to his
appraisal rights based on claims of unfair treatment,6 this consequence
does not alleviate counsel's conflict-of-interest dilemma. Counsel who
represents both the parent and the subsidiary corporation in a squeeze-
out situation will find it difficult to represent the interests of minority
shareholders adequately. Even where the subsidiary has retained separate
counsel, such counsel is faced with the dilemma that what is beneficial to
the subsidiary's controlling shareholder (i.e., the parent corporation)
may unfortunately be detrimental to the minority.65
From the perspective of corporate accountability, minority share-
holders comprise an essential component of a parent-controlled subsidi-
ary.66 Additionally, the parent, over a period of time, has elected to reap
the benefits of a public equity market for its subsidiary's stock rather
than taking the enterprise private.67 Consequently, the interests of the
61. See, e.g., Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 568, 473 N.E.2d 19, 25, 483
N.Y.S.2d 667, 673 (1984); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d
107, 109-10 (1952); Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE
L.J. 1354, 1354 (1978).
62. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-13 (Del. 1983).
63. Id. at 714.
64. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN § 302A.601 (West 1985); Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc.,
178 Conn. 263, 274, 422 A.2d 311, 318 (1979).
65. See, e.g., Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 342 (Del. Ch. 1984). Moreover, SEC
rules 13e-3 and 13e-4 apply to going-private transactions. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3, 13e-4 (1987).
With respect to rule 13e-3, see Exchange Act Release No. 34-16,075, 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736
(1979). In general, rule 13e-3, prohibits "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or prac-
tices in connection with going private transactions and prescribes filing, disclosure, and dis-
semination requirements as a means reasonably designed to prevent such acts or practices." Id.
at 46,737; see also Exchange Act Release No. 34-16,112, 44 Fed. Reg. 49,406 (1979) (Commis-
sion adopted rule 13e-4 to govern an issuer's tender offer for its own securities). In general,
rule 13e-4 requires that a schedule 13E-4 be filed with the SEC, and establishes disclosure,
dissemination, and compliance requirements. Note that an issuer's tender offer, which is regu-
lated by rule 13e-4, may also be a going private transaction subject to rule 13e-3; in such
instances, the issuer must comply with both rules.
66. See generally Eisenberg, The Legal Decision-Making Roles of Shareholders and Man-
agement in Modern Corporate Decision Making, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969) (role of sharehold-
ers in corporate decisionmaking); Knauss, Corporate Governance-A Moving Target, 79 MICH.
L. REV. 478 (1981) (governance problems in quasi-publicly traded corporations); Solomon,
Going Private: Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Proposals for Re-
form, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 141 (1975) (potential for harm to minority shareholders in going-
private transactions).
67. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 61, at 1354; Toms, Compensating Shareholders
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minority should be viewed as an integral aspect in ascertaining the limits
of permissible corporate conduct. Because the interests of the parent cor-
poration as controlling shareholder of the subsidiary often conflict with
the best interests of the minority, a disabling conflict of interest should be
presumed, thereby precluding the attorney from representing all affected
parties. 68
Accordingly, the outside directors of the subsidiary should be desig-
nated as a duly authorized committee charged with the task of bargain-
ing with the parent corporation to help ensure fair treatment for the
minority. 69 To effectuate this objective, the committee should retain an
investment banker and counsel with no prior affiliation with either corpo-
ration or its fiduciaries. 70  Although the problem of structural bias
among directors is not resolved by this proposal,7 1 the impact of any
such bias is likely to be alleviated by the retention of outside experts who
should have the requisite independence. 72 Although imperfect, the pro-
Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 548 (1978); Comment, Front-End
Loaded Tender Offers: The Application of Federal and State Law to an Innovative Corporate
Acquisition Technique, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 389 (1982); see also the SEC going-private rules,
rules 13e-3 and 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-3, 13e-4 (1987).
68. See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709-10 n.7 (Del. 1983) (parent-
designated director on subsidiary's board owes subsidiary and its shareholders an "uncompro-
mising duty of loyalty"); K. DAVIDSON, MEGAMERGERS: CORPORATE AMERICA'S BILLION-
DOLLAR TAKEOVERS 10 (1985) ("In theory, shareholders are the source of all power in a free
enterprise system because they are the owners. In practice, however, the modern corporation
is run by its executives.").
69. See ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations
§ 5.10, at 19 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1987) ("In the context of a parent-subsidiary relationship,
directors of the subsidiary should not be considered disinterested and independent if they have
a relationship to the parent as a director, senior executive, or employee of the parent or as a
senior executive or employee of the subsidiary."). In the setting of a parent-subsidiary merger,
bargaining principally will involve matters of fair value, namely price, although fair dealing
also plays an integral role. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 n.7, 711-15; Steinberg & Lindahl,
supra note 58, at 366-81.
70. To an extent, it appears that this proposal is being implemented. See 19 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 175 (1987) (statement of Arthur Fleischer, Jr.); Putka & Winter, BP Increases
Bid For Standard Oil By $450 Million, Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1987, at 2, col. 2 ("The new bid [by
British Petroleum Co. which owns 55% of Standard Oil Co.] won the acceptance of seven
outside Standard Oil directors who had sought better terms."). Note, however, that the invest-
ment banker and counsel selected by the outside directors often may have a prior affiliation
with either of the corporations or subject fiduciaries, hence giving rise to the structural bias
problem. See infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
72. Cf. Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 58, at 406:
Under the present framework ... few independent parties would thoroughly evaluate
a company without a reasonable chance of successful purchase, except for the invest-
ment banker selected by management to render a fairness opinion. Generally, the
minority interest cannot afford to hire its own investment banker. Therefore, to help
effectuate the intent of the independent evaluation alternative, the outside directors
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posal provides a practical and more enlightened solution.
The same standards as set forth above arguably should apply when a
controlling individual shareholder, by means of a forced transaction such
as a merger with an entity wholly owned by such shareholder and cre-
ated for the singular purpose of effectuating the transaction, 73 takes the
corporation private, thereby eliminating the minority.74 In such situa-
tions, for the reasons stated above, 75 the outside directors of the corpora-
tion should be designated as a duly authorized committee to represent
the interests of the minority. The committee should retain an investment
banker and counsel who have no prior affiliation with the corporation or
its fiduciaries.76 This scenario, however, manifests the potential of
outside director structural bias in an individually dominated corporation
(presuming there are outside directors on the board). As a result, these
added procedural mechanisms, such as the appointment of separate
counsel, may provide little substantive protection for the minority. Thus,
the minority may be provided with more meaningful relief by a flexible
interpretation of fiduciary duty obligations and of valuation in the ap-
praisal proceeding.77 In any event, and particularly if separate counsel is
not retained, the corporation's general counsel should remain cognizant
of the conflicting interests implicated and should advise the board of di-
rectors to adhere to the fiduciary duties owed to the minority. Indeed,
because the controlling shareholder will benefit financially from the
transaction, counsel should look solely to the financially disinterested
members of the board to represent the enterprise. 78
of the subsidiary corporation should retain an investment banker who has no previ-
ous contacts with the parent or subsidiary corporation or with either corporation's
management. Through the use of the fairness opinion relied on by minority share-
holders, an independent investment banker who is free of the usual structural biases
will help insure that the going private transaction is fair to the minority. The likeli-
hood of fairness will further increase if the courts hold the investment banker to a
standard of reasonable care in the preparation of the opinion. Moreover, when the
corporation hires the investment banker specifically to render an opinion for the ben-
efit of the minority, a stronger basis exists for recognizing a fiduciary relationship.
73. For explanatory material on triangular mergers and other corporate combinations,
see L. SOLOMON, R. STEVENSON, & D. SCHWARTZ, CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 941-
51 (1982).
74. See supra notes 59, 65.
75. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
76. See 19 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 175 (1987); infra notes 93-105 and accompanying
text.
77. See supra notes 66-69.
78. In short, this is an interested director's transaction in which the participating director
should be disabled from exerting undue influence upon the corporation's response to the trans-
action. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1984); Bulbulia & Pinto,
Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Stan-
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B. Leveraged Buy-Outs
Leveraged buy-outs in which public shareholders are cashed-out
and corporate insiders obtain a substantial equity interest in the ongoing
enterprise raise troublesome questions of conflicts of interest. 79 In this
situation, the insiders' interests in procuring a bargain price are adverse
to the public shareholders' objective of maximizing their returns. More-
over, the concept of insiders enhancing their pecuniary interests through
the use of borrowed funds collateralized with corporate assets and sub-
ject to repayment out of corporate profits strikes some authorities as re-
pugnant to public shareholder welfare. s0
It thus should not be surprising that both the insiders and public
shareholders should have separate counsel to represent their opposing
interests. 8' Because the insiders have a financial stake in the transaction,
they no longer should be looked to as representing the corporate entity.
8 2
Hence, the role of the corporation's general counsel in this context may
well be to help ensure that adequate disclosure is made (to the board of
directors and shareholders) and to advise the disinterested directors as to
the legality of the buy-out. In this context, corporate counsel should ap-
prise the disinterested directors of their fiduciary duties and have them
informed of the material facts (including the procurement of a fairness
opinion8 3). Such precautions increase the likelihood that a disinterested
board determination to authorize the buy-out and the valuation reached
by such a board will be reasonably informed.8 4 In addition, the very real
possibility of structural bias calls for the consultative attorney concept as
discussed above to be implemented in the managerial leveraged buy-out
dards?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 201, 218-23 (1977); Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of
Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 65-68 (1966).
79. See, e.g., Sommer, "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,010, at 84,700 (1974) ("The shareholder must
no longer be a second class citizen. Once he is invited to feast and pays his admission, those
who own the tent must not be able to usher him out at the end of the second course with only
the menu as his souvenir.").
80. See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 61, at 1359; Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reap-
praisal of Santa Fe: Rule lOb-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 272-73 n.49
(1979); Galbraith, The 1929 Parallel, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1987, at 62; Lowenstein,
Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730 (1985); Phillips, Managerial Misuse of Prop-
erty: The Synthesizing Thread in Corporate Doctrine, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 184 (1979).
81. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 70, 78-80.
83. See A. BORDEN, GOING PRIVATE § 9.01 (1982). The investment banker retained to
render the fairness opinion should have no prior affiliation with any of the parties or fiducia-
ries. See Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 58, at 406; supra note 72; infra notes 93-105 and
accompanying text.
84. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
[Vol. 39
setting.85
IV. Substantive Effect Of Procedural Mechanisms
This Article has suggested that in the takeover bid context, special
counsel, such as the consultative attorney, be retained by the outside di-
rectors to advise the board of directors and that, in certain other acquisi-
tion situations, committees comprised of disinterested directors be
advised by separate counsel. After receiving the advice of separately re-
tained counsel and investment bankers, the board and pertinent commit-
tees may better represent the interests at stake. This scenario raises the
question whether procedural mechanisms provide any meaningful sub-
stantive protection to corporate and minority shareholder interests. s6
The problem of director structural bias has been discussed above
and elaborated upon by courts and commentators.8 7 Moreover, the al-
leged bias of investment bankers in rendering fairness and other valua-
tion opinions has been raised but certainly not resolved.88 Attorney
conflict-of-interest dilemmas also come into play in the corporate acquisi-
tion context. A law firm that annually derives hundreds of thousands if
not millions of dollars in fees from a corporate client has a financial self-
interest in maintaining that entity as an ongoing, independent concern
85. See supra notes 25-35, 46-58 and accompanying text. Note, moreover, that the
outside general counsel should be wary of representing both management and the issuer. Such
dual representation may result in waiver of the attorney-client privilege. See A. BORDEN,
supra note 83, § 9.01. Indeed, normally counsel should represent solely the entity. Id.
86. See remarks of former SEC Commissioner Longstreth's criticizing certain procedural
mechanisms, such as investment banker fairness opinions, as providing no substantive benefit
to public shareholders, in 16 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 641 (1984) and 15 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1908 (1983).
87. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
88. See remarks of former SEC Commissioner Longstreth, supra note 86. This alleged
bias is further complicated because:
A problem in the application of this theory to fairness opinions lies in the lack of
concrete standards in the investment banking community. It appears that, in deter-
mining value, the conduct of investment bankers, unlike accountants, is not governed
by a set of industry guidelines other than those general factors that the Weinberger
court laid out. Thus, the weight in a given case assigned to such factors as asset,
market, dividend, and earning values is left largely to the discretion of the individual
investment banker. Addressing the valuation techniques of two reputable investment
bankers in one recent case, the Delaware court referred to the "questionable method-
ology employed" as well as the "quick and cursory" analysis used before concluding
that "both the opinions of Morgan Stanley and of Goldman-Sachs leave something
to be desired." Moreover, even when investment bankers use the same data for arriv-
ing at their opinions, they often express different opinions as to value.
Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 58, at 399 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
712-13 (Del. 1983); citing and quoting Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 344 (Del. Ch.
1984)).
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with the incumbent management intact. 89 Successful consummation of a
third-party takeover bid-whether by merger, tender offer, or other-
wise-normally signifies that the third-party's law firm will be retained
to represent the combined enterprise. 90 Although a number of courts
have refused to recognize this potential for conflict,91 such an approach
ignores the realities of law-firm economics. The loss of a major client
often causes a financial setback for members of a firm, and the loss of a
few such clients may spell catastrophe.92
Consequently, purportedly protective mechanisms may offer no
meaningful benefit to corporate and shareholder interests if boards of di-
rectors and committees comprised of disinterested directors are advised
by counsel and investment bankers who have a material economic stake
in maintaining the status quo. The inherent structural bias of the outside
directors (and the more obvious pecuniary interests of the insiders), 93
when combined with the opinions rendered by their professional advisers
(e.g., counsel and investment bankers), normally will effectuate the re-
sponse desired by incumbent management.94 Moreover, because such ac-
tions taken to maintain the corporation as a viable entity95 will be
engineered by directors who are likely to be deemed disinterested under
the applicable case law, 96 the inveterate business judgment rule will apply
89. The key aspect here, irrespective of whether a leveraged buy-out or hostile takeover
bid is involved, is that incumbent management will continue to operate the enterprise on an
ongoing basis.
90. See L. SOLOMON, R. STEVENSON, & D. SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 1100 ("The
[target's] professional advisors, whether they are investment bankers or lawyers, are likely to
lose a client, and, especially in the case of a lawyer, the loss may have severe consequences.").
91. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 794 (2d Cir. 1979) (court refused to
label counsel an "interested" director absent a claim that counsel voted in exchange for contin-
ued retention of his firm).
92. See Gray, Law Firms' Big Fee Hikes Reflect Higher Pay and Booming Business, Wall
St. J., Mar. 19, 1987, at 37, col. 4 ("Several law firms have collapsed in recent months: Sage
Gray Todd & Sims, one of the oldest on Wall Street, and Memel, Jacobs & Ellsworth in Los
Angeles.").
93. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir.) (applying
Delaware law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
95. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (self-tender
by corporation for its own shares). Note, however, that the business judgment rule may not
apply to board decisions favoring a particular bidder where the enterprise is to be broken up.
See Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,
92,863, at 94,211 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying Michigan law); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM
Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York law); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180-82 (Del. 1986) (applying Delaware
law).
96. See, e.g., Panter, 646 F.2d at 294 (applying Delaware law); Crouse-Hinds Company
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in many jurisdictions to insulate such actions from successful challenge. 97
The presence of structural bias cannot be eliminated under the pres-
ent corporate governance framework. Nonetheless, proper implementa-
tion of the consultative attorney in the takeover bid context and of
counsel for the outside directors in certain other acquisition settings,
such as in squeeze-out mergers, may enhance corporate accountability
with relatively minor costs. Although directors may tend to retain advis-
ers who are predisposed to rendering advice having justifiable grounds in
favor of incumbent management, 98 implementation of the following prac-
tices with respect to consultative counsel and similar experts may lessen
this potential for bias. First, the attorney and investment banker sepa-
rately retained should be selected by the outside directors. Second, such
advisers should have no professional or personal affiliations with any of
the subject companies or their managements, including the outside direc-
tors. Third, if these advisers have engaged in this type of representation
(such as serving as consultative attorney) on a fairly frequent basis, the
v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702-04 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York law); Pogostin v.
Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624-25 (Del. 1984) (applying Delaware law).
97. Of course, certain requirements must be met before the business judgment rule may
be invoked, including that such decision be (a) a deliberative one (b) which was reasonably
informed (c) made by directors who acted in good faith without a disabling conflict of interest
and (d) had a rational basis. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-74 (Del. 1985);
Steinberg, The American Law Institute's Draft Restatement on Corporate Governance: The
Business Judgment Rule, Related Principles, and Some General Observations, 37 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 295, 301-04 (1983). Moreover, a few courts have declined to construe the business judg-
ment rule expansively in the takeover context. See supra note 46.
98. See, e.g., Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A
Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959. Referring to special litigation
committees comprised of outside directors, Professor Cox opined:
Commentators have explained in detail why the special litigation committee's inde-
pendence may be more apparent than real. Their concern is founded on the observa-
tion that the defendants and the members of the special litigation committee share a
common cultural bond: directorship of a public corporation. The natural empathy
and collegiality that this bond engenders makes an adverse judgment of a colleague's
behavior distasteful at best. Also, when the committee is formed after the instigation
of the derivative suit, the situation is rife with opportunities for the defendants to
select for committee membership those directors most sympathetic to their position.
The committee's independence may be further undermined by its members' desire to
curry favor with their fellow directors or with the business community in general.
Finally, special litigation committees operate under the constant threat of dissolution
should they displease the board by pursuing the plaintiff's cause with excessive zeal.
The likelihood that these factors will corrupt the committee's independent judg-
ment will be referred to as "structural bias." Whatever one's view about the impact
of the factors that feed a committee's structural bias, the committee's record is itself
disquieting: although there have been more than a score of special litigation commit-
tee cases to date, in all but one the committee concluded that the suit in question was
not in the corporation's best interest.
Id. at 962-63 (footnotes omitted).
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advice rendered (providing that the position recommended is known)
should not favor management or the committee retaining such advisers
on a near unanimous basis. Fourth, during the representation, the insid-
ers should communicate any information to a committee comprised of
outside directors through counsel rather than directly to the outside di-
rectors. Fifth, after the representation terminates, the separately retained
counsel and investment banker should not be permitted to represent any
of the subject entities for a substantial period of time-for example, ten
years. 99
Adherence to these suggested practices will reduce the potential for
bias and, at the same time, will not have an adverse effect in procuring
expertized advice. Requiring that specially retained investment bankers
and counsel (such as the consultative attorney or counsel for the outside
directors) be selected by the outside directors, have no prior affiliation
with the pertinent "actors," have not continually proffered advice
favorable to management, and cannot thereafter be retained by the sub-
ject entities for a substantial time period, 100 significantly increases the
likelihood of the board or committee receiving disinterested professional
assistance. Moreover, by channeling communications through coun-
sel,' 0 ' the parties most directly interested will have less opportunity to
exert undue influence on a committee comprised of outside directors.
It may be asserted that this proposal is too formalistic and seeks to
implement a rigid monitoring mechanism where none is necessary. A
survey of so-called disinterested board and committee determinations be-
lies this assertion. For example, in derivative suits, the special litigation
committee, 0 2 after receiving the advice of specially retained counsel,10 3
99. At times, these requirements may not be practical to implement on a rigorous basis.
For example, there may be compelling circumstances present that should permit counsel to
represent one of the subject entities before the expiration of the ten-year period. Nonetheless,
the burden should be placed upon the party seeking an exception to the enumerated practices.
The gist of the practices is to help ensure as much as feasible that the board or a committee
comprised of outside directors receives separately retained advice that is of high caliber.
Although perfection is not possible, any significant breach of the listed practices threatens the
objectives sought to be achieved by the proposed framework.
100. See supra note 99.
101. Hence, for example, the insiders can communicate in this context with the outside
directors comprising the committee only indirectly through the corporation's general counsel
(or through the insiders' separately retained counsel if that is the case) who in turn will com-
municate with counsel advising the committee. This means of communication reduces the risk
of undue influence by the insiders.
102. See, e.g., Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983):
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); M. STEINBERG, supra note 12, §§ 14.03-.04.
103. Significantly, such separately retained counsel for the committee often has some prior
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nearly always determines that the derivative action against the corporate
fiduciaries should be dismissed. 10 4 Moreover, in corporate acquisitions,
the evidence illustrates that, irrespective of whether counsel or an invest-
ment banker is retained by a potential acquiror, target, or other relevant
party, the advice proffered normally is that desired by the retaining
party.105 Hence, there is a very real problem. Unfortunately, however,
there has been a general refusal by the corporate bar and investment
bankers to acknowledge the conflicts of interest implicated. The propos-
als set forth in this Article are intended to stimulate discussion and in-
duce corrective actions.
Conclusion
This Article takes the position that there are serious conflicts-of-
interest dilemmas confronting counsel in the corporate acquisition con-
text and accordingly has recommended a framework for application.
Thus far, however, little has been done to resolve (let alone address or
even recognize) this problem. This Article, as well as others contained in
the Symposium, should bring into sharper focus the difficult issues pres-
ent in this setting. The time is now for the corporate bar to face these
issues.
affiliation with members of the committee or the insiders. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981) (committee retained as counsel the law firm of one of the
directors). Hence, the enumerated recommended practices discussed above are not satisfied.
See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
104. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying Connecticut law),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Cox, supra note 98, at 962-63.
105. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983); Joseph v. Shell
Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch. 1984).

